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Polish Perspectives on American History: Insights, Interpretations, Revisions. 
ed. by Halina Parafianowizc, Białystok: University of Białystok, 2013. 359 pages.
This volume is a collection of various Polish scholars’ essays dealing with different themes and phases of the history of the United States. In many ways it makes one recall the volume that Hungarian scholars contributed to and was published unfortunately only 
in Hungarian, Gyarmatokból impérium ([From Colonies to Empire] ed. Tibor Frank Budapest: 
Gondolat Kiadó, 2007). All contributors have been participants in the Andrzej Bartnicki Fo-
rum for the Advanced Studies of the United States, an annual gathering of the Polish Ame-
rican Studies profession. The Forum commemorates the late Professor Bartnicki, who is 
considered the father of American Studies in Poland, in many ways similar to László Országh 
in Hungary. The Forum provides a place, in addition to seasoned professors of American his-
tory, for young doctoral students to present their papers in different fields pertaining to the 
United States, and the participants receive immediate feedback on their research projects in 
form of healthy criticism, suggestions, and help from more experienced colleagues. The pre-
sent volume is a collection of twenty-two essays from participants in the first ten years of the 
Forum, and it is trying to give a wide scope of the different issues that Polish scholars in the 
American Studies have been dealing with lately. Although the volume admittedly cannot do 
justice to the first ten years and thus is not to be looked upon as an exhaustive presentation 
of the American Studies community in Poland, still, the chosen writings give a good idea of the 
broad range of what these scholars are trying to achieve. 
The essays provide such a vast array of areas within the title of the volume that it cannot 
be the aim of the reviewer to give an exhaustive picture of all of them. Instead, it might be 
a more useful approach to select a few that one finds perhaps more compelling than others 
with personal biases to be sure. The essays range from American exceptionalism through 
early American history to US diplomatic history, in a chronological order. Not surprisingly, 
the Polish angle comes forward sometimes, that is, some of the essays deal with Polish-Amer-
ican relations, diplomatic and otherwise. Some of them are more deeply-researched, while a 
few provide a more informative reading.
Perhaps it is worth mentioning Anna Stocka’s essay, which deals with the Polish press 
review of the highly contested US presidential election of 1876 (103-114). The really interesting 
part is, as it turns out, that the Polish news readers of the time did not have to rely only on 
reprint of news coming from Western Europe, since there were two Polish correspondents 
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providing the news and background information surrounding this pivotal event. Another es-
say deals with the relations between American trade unions and Solidarity during the 1980 
(Agnieszka Subocz-Gwizdek’s essay, 315-327), which puts in the limelight a rarely-studied side 
of the tearing down of the communist era and the minor but still important role of NGOs. 
Another interesting piece is Mateusz Bogdanovicz’s essay that deals with how the United 
States used its power status and the plight of Great Britain in 1940-1941 to secure economic 
and strategic advantages (181-198). He argues that Franklin Delano Roosevelt understood the 
nature of the current situation and both ousted Great Britain of the Western Hemisphere (a 
long dream of American leadership), plus he made the United States economically undefeat-
able for a long time to come. 
This reviewer found Michał Leśniewski’s piece on US-British relations during and around 
the Boer War one of the best in the collection (115-129). This writing put American foreign 
policy interests in perspective, and emphasized well what around the turn of the 19th and 20th 
centuries the US foreign policy decision makers found most crucial to their liking. How the 
changed position of the United States in the international arena came to play an important 
role in supporting British aims notwithstanding popular sympathy to the underdog Boer side. 
Another strong piece of writing is that of Joanna Modrzejewska-Leśniewska’s (131-148), whose 
portraying the nature and difficulties of establishing US-Afghan diplomatic relations from the 
late 1910s all the way till 1943, has also repercussions for other countries and regions as well, 
Central Europe perhaps not excluded. Her conclusion might be as well used for Poland and 
Hungary in the Interwar years: “For the United States, Afghanistan was one of many far away 
countries in which the U.S. had limited interests.” (147)
One of the most pleasing piece of writing is Halina Parafianowicz’s article, “Between 
the Spoils System and Professionalism: U.S. Diplomats in Poland, 1919-1939” (149-163). This 
thoroughly researched article is surveying the American attitude toward Poland in the in-
terwar years with an eye on the choice of the certain ministers and ambassadors accredited 
there. Since Poland was perhaps seen as the most crucial of the new Central and Eastern 
European countries (it was one of the seven countries in the whole of Europe to boast of hav-
ing an American ambassador), it is expected that the United States showed a large amount 
of interest, a fact that should have been reflected in the careful choice of diplomats sent to 
Warsaw. Poland was seen as an important country between defeated Germany and Bolshe-
vik Soviet Russia. Still, except for the first American diplomat sent there, Hugh S. Gibson, the 
interest hoped for did not materialize. After Gibson’s stint the following representatives were 
more typically political appointees and not professional diplomats. This was not an isolated 
phenomenon to be sure. Other countries in the region “suffered” the same fate. On the one 
hand, in the wake of the Rogers Act of 1924, the aim to fill up the ranks of American diploma-
cy was a slow process, while on the other, the Eastern-Central European region, with other 
places around the globe, had lost much of its significance to Washington, and only with the 
coming of World War II got in the focus again, about that proved to be too late.
Halina Bieluk’s essay explores US cultural diplomacy during the Cold War (227-242), 
and provides a window onto how many–sided the American effort was in trying to counter 
communist indoctrination anywhere in the world and expand the understanding of America. 
Another side of this Cold War cultural diplomacy is the topic of Renata Nowaczewska’s essay 
(243-256), which takes a closer look at the United States Information Agency (USIS), which 
was known as United States Information Service (USIS) in Europe. Interestingly, while the 
promotion of US culture and policies seem to have been among the highest interest of the 
various US governments, Congress gave a cold shoulder to the undertaking. 
On the other hand, several essays deal with anti-Americanism, or, at least, negative 
feelings concerning the United States, thus providing the largest structural coherence in the 
volume. What is somewhat surprising but not totally shocking is that this phenomenon ap-
peared and still appears not only in Polish communist discourse (Jakub Tyszkievicz’s essay, 
215-225), but also in the Netherlands, where, as it turns out, there has been a long tradition 
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of anti-American sentiment with periodic waves towards animosity (Anna Wyrisz’s study, 
199-213). Tomasz Gajewski’s “The Origins of Anti-Americanism in the Middle East” (279-297) 
shifts the focus out of Europe to the constant trouble spot of post-World War II. While 
after the First World War the image of the United States was clearly positive in the region, 
thanks to oil companies and Cold War politics, and the American-backed establishment of 
Israel, led to a drastic change by the late 1950s: “the perception of America in the Arab 
world from a positive, unselfish power to an imperial, anti-Arab, anti-Islam, pro-Israeli force” 
(286-287). With backing sometimes oppressive regimes for possible gains on the Cold War 
chessboard, let alone the military muscle used on many occasions, the United States was 
more and more perceived as an imperial giant. Also, deep-lying differences on worldview in 
general fueled by religious differences – all this by today has led to a seemingly unbridgeable 
gap of fervent anti-Americanism in the Middle East. By bad political choices in the past has 
transformed the region into the most hostile territory for the United States in which it does 
not wish to be embroiled but still, it simply cannot escape it. As a final piece to this theme, 
Ewelina Waśko-Owsiejczuk’s piece deals with anti-Americanism in the world at large after 
the shameful events at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo during the Iraq war under George W. 
Bush’ presidency (329-343). As she rightly observes, this caused perhaps the biggest setback 
to American prestige around the world in recent decades. Not only in the Arab and Muslim 
countries did the United States suffer a huge loss of credibility, but also among many allied 
countries among NATO members. Perhaps nothing left as shameful a mark on George W. 
Bush’s presidency as these human rights violations during the war on terror. Fervent an-
ti-Americanism, never a long-absented feature in the world, only seems to have reemerged 
in the wake of these acts and, as recent events show, it is here to stay.
The closing essay is again connected to Polish-American relations. The title of Jadwiga 
Kiwerska’s essay (345-359) is setting the tone: “America: Poland’s Perfect Ally.” The title not-
withstanding, what she explores comes as somewhat ambiguous perfection. Although she 
rightly states of the relations of Poland with the United States as “incredibly positive baggage” 
(345), the question perhaps should be put into: “in relation to what?” The turbulent and tragic 
centuries of Polish history obviously orients the country toward the United States, for both 
realistic and ideological reasons. However, as the author herself points out frequently in the 
essay, the American partner can never see Poland as a strategic partner for simply because it 
cannot weigh in comparison to such countries as Russia or Germany when it comes to the big 
picture. The United States considers Poland as an important partner, but nothing more (not 
that it is not a positive sign). However, Polish political and average opinion is disillusioned with 
the American position vis-à-vis Poland, in which the latest disappointment was the American 
decision under Barack Obama not to have the missile site built on Polish ground. Therefore, 
it is little wonder that in the conclusion Kiwerska warns against seeing the United States as 
a perfect ally, rather “a powerful and valuable partner” should be the realistic expectation 
(358). Perhaps then, a question mark would have been legitimate in the title of the essay.
It would be also nice to see a similar edited volume of various essays coming from the 
other ex-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the countries from their vicin-
ities. Thus, a collection concerning perception of the United States in a historical perspective 
done by Czech, Romanian, Bulgarian, or other scholars could broaden the view of their Hun-
garian and Polish counterparts.
The Inauguration of “Organized Political Warfare”: Cold War Organizations 
Sponsored by the National committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee, 
Katalin Kádár Lynn, ed., Saint Helena, CA: Helena History Press, LLC, 2013. 604 pages.
This bulky book, which is a collection of expansive essays representing a wide array of 
contributors, concentrates on one aspect of the American Cold War psychological warfare 
strategy. Namely, on the Free Europe Committee, a large organization mainly made up by 
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Eastern and Central European political refugees who believed that with American backing 
their respective native countries might be liberated from Soviet domination. After World 
War II and in the soon-to-spread Cold War, it is understandable that the American leader-
ship was looking for new ways to challenge the new type of danger. The Soviet Union with its 
inimical ideology and robust military power meant a direct affront to the United States. Since 
traditional war between the two superpowers was out of the question, it was left to fight it 
out mainly in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. The covert psychological warfare 
belonged chiefly to the first, and was aiming to undermine the Soviet Union and its puppet 
satellite countries in every way possible short of war. 
The eleven thoroughly researched essays in this book take a look at different angles of 
the aforementioned US effort during the Cold War. All of them are about the Free Europe 
Committee and its different regional councils, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Ro-
mania, or the Baltic States. Some of the essays deal with overall attempts to win some sort of 
“victory” by the help of the Free Europe University, for example. Some of them concentrate 
rather on an individual imbedded in the early phase of the Cold War. Together, they offer an 
impressive collection of an important and so far undeservedly neglected sphere of the period. 
This is first and foremost thanks to the editor, Katalin Kádár Lynn, who is also the author of 
two articles in the volume. The goal of a review cannot be but only the overall impression 
with highlighting some of the most interesting aspects of the studies.
In the first such article, “At War While at Peace: United States Cold War Policy and the 
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.,” (7-70) Lynn overviews the launch of the Amer-
ican psychological warfare, the covert means based on organizations made up by private 
citizens, first and foremost from the émigrés and refugees from the countries representing 
Central and Eastern Europe that had found themselves under the sudden political yoke of the 
Soviet Union by 1948.  By that summer, the US leadership had understood and accepted that 
covert means must be a way of dealing with the Soviet Union; the Americans had to do some-
thing about the Soviet effort to expand their way of ideology and influence. Like many other 
ideas, this notion, coated in the national security jacket, also sprang from George F. Kennan, 
the famous author of containment, the basic American Cold War strategy. His understand-
ing of the history and recent actions of the Soviet Union and his own native country made 
Kennan argue for the launch of a secretly funded private organization with the overt aim, via 
covert means, to gain whatever inroad in the newly acquired satellite countries in the Eastern 
and Central European region, and thus to undermine the Soviet regime and its influence 
within these countries. (17-20) The most spectacular branch was the well-known Radio Free 
Europe (RFE from 1951) and the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN from 1954).
Lynn well outlines the story beyond the foundation of the Free Europe Committee. 
The organization “operated under the stewardship of the State Department and the Depart-
ment of Defense and covertly funded through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the 
life of the organization from 1949 – 1971”. (24) Possibly none other than Allen Dulles was the 
principal organizer, who gathered around him highly trustworthy colleagues from his spying 
past. (23) The National Committee for Free Europe, Inc. (NCFE), as the organization was 
called between 1949 and 1954, comprised such household names as Adolph A. Berle, Jr., 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Joseph C. Grew, Henry R. Luce, or Darryl Zanuck, together with 
the ubiquitous Allen Dulles. These people shared the common worldview that communism 
was a deadly threat and should be stopped. The NCFE, Inc.’s main purpose was propaganda 
activities in various forms. 
Despite the harsh anti-Communist rhetoric and campaign often led by the NCFE/FEC 
from the late 1940s and up until 1956, the Polish and Hungarian uprisings, Kádár emphasizes 
that “United States foreign policy of this era was based on pragmatic perspective that recog-
nized the post-WWII European status quo and accepted the prevailing balance of power with 
the Soviet Union.” (45) The NCFE/FEC’s goal changed in time and tone accordingly. Thus, 
the main aim was “a broad program of psychological warfare and the further development of 
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the radios and their propaganda program.” (51). From that time on, the organization first and 
foremost was involved in helping refugees’ lives in the West, mainly in Western Europe. (56) 
The organization came to a halt in 1971 to lack of funds, which was again a reflection of the 
policy shift in US foreign thinking. (59) In Kádár’s conclusion, the NCFE/FEC played a positive 
role, however, especially from the émigrés’ and refugees’ point of view, because support 
was provided by various means “keeping intact the exiles’ national spirit, their cultures and 
languages.” (60) Whether such an organization and its spawns really “helped hasten the final 
disintegration of the Soviet occupation of Central and East Europe” is, in the opinion of this 
reviewer, a little bit farfetched though. (60)
Kádár’s other article deals with the history of the Hungarian National Council (“the 
most successful of the national councils sponsored by the NCFE/FEC”) from 1947, later to be 
called Hungarian National Committee. (300) This was the very first well-organized national 
council of the Soviet satellite countries’ exile communities. The HNC was criticized to be only 
a propaganda tool of US foreign policy but not a true representative of the American Hun-
garian community, a valid claim. (246-47) Internal schism and intrigue were constant features 
that plagued this council just like the others (248-258), many members being unable to adjust 
themselves to the new environment and new rules of the political game. Understandably, the 
HNC was most active during and in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution in Hungary. (277-293) 
As a subchapter to Kádár’s exhaustive study, it is worth noting the specialized short chapter 
on one individual’s brief introduction to his exile years. Tibor Frank’s article on the Hungarian 
sociologist-politician Imre Kovács gives a nice example of a person’s complicated role in and 
out of both the Hungarian National Council and the NCFE/FEC. (307-322)
Maria Kokoncheva’s piece studies the Bulgarian National Council, but first and foremost 
puts its dynamic leader, Georgi Mihov Dimtirov, in the spotlight. (363-395) Her conclusion 
might be applied to the whole tragedy of these national councils in the framework of the Cold 
War: “All of these efforts bore very few practical results, often going no further then [sic] to 
make the West aware that there were people who still had the hope and desire to continue 
the fight for political and personal freedom in the countries behind the Iron Curtain.” (390)
Aside from the obvious political agenda that these organizations followed, one of their 
major contribution was helping their fellow refugees to settle down in the United States. Also, 
they sent aid packages to those remaining behind, and tried to secure and relay information 
pertaining to the domestic situation in their home countries. 
An unfortunate but typical feature was disunity among the respective exiles. Disagree-
ment, strife, quarrels, and jealousy were the order of these years, and this rule bore out 
basically in every national council. A good example for this was the Czechoslovak exiles’ case 
in Francis Raska’s study on the history of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. (71-120) For the 
better part of three decades, the various members showed little unity. In this case, even such 
nationalistic disputes erupted as between the Czechs and Slovaks within the Czechoslovak 
exile community. (80) Next to the almost continuous funding problems, another feature that 
was omnipresent in every exile community was the lack of unity between the first and sec-
ond generation exiles. The first group often saw the latter as non-legitimate since living for a 
number of years in their home countries and often filling governmental posts.
If disunity was a typical feature of these councils, then the Polish exile groups took the 
cake. Anna Mazurkiewicz’s study well represents this schism that took almost epic proportions, 
and went so far that on the Assembly of Captive European Nations there were two separate 
Polish exile organizations represented. (323-361) These people simply could not manage to 
send representatives of one single unified group to ACEN in more than a quarter of a century. 
Marius Petraru’s piece on the Romanian National Council, for example, points out that the 
Romanian exiles represented a constant crisis management and disunity. (128-131, 143-153) 
The Romanian National Council is also a good example of agony taking place when funding 
proved difficult. After the Nixon administration decided to cut funding to the various national 
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councils at the end of 1971, most of them found themselves in dire straits, and soon the Ro-
manian Council basically ceased functioning. (184-186)
Jonathan H. L’Hommedieu calls attention to the unique and ambiguous example of 
the national councils of the three Baltic States, which had been incorporated to the Soviet 
Union by tacit American and British approval. Therefore, originally the NCFE omitted these 
exile groups from its activities. (202) As elsewhere, the various factions among émigrés was a 
contentious issue here too. (204-208) In the spring of 1951 the Baltic consultative panels were 
created and their activities were brought under the auspices of the NCFE, and one year later 
were the respective national councils of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established. (206) The 
US non-recognition policy concerning the Baltic States ensued another issue, namely, where 
to broadcast: through Radio Free Europe (where they wanted) or Voice of America (the of-
ficial American propaganda tool, where after a short spell they were, to their dissatisfaction). 
Mazurkiewicz’ other study focuses on a very short period at the end of the 1950s. (397-
437) In it she discusses the ACEN’s role in trying to modify US foreign policy in light of the 
highly visible tours of various Soviet leaders, that of Nikita Khrushchev’s standing out natural-
ly in September 1959. Although the ACEN tried relentlessly through its lobby work to decry 
the efforts of the Eisenhower administration trying to find closer common ground with the 
Soviets, the obvious possible gains for American foreign policy were much more important 
than to listen to conscientious slogans from representatives of the captive nations of East 
and Central Europe. As the tension grew between official American foreign policy and the 
ACEN’s agenda, the State Department and the FEC “begun to slowly but steadily phase out 
– politically and financially – the ACEN.” (427) Interests come always first. 
The last two essays in the volume are case studies of how far the NCFE/FEC tried to 
combat communism on various levels. One is Veronika Durin-Hornyik’s study on the Stras-
bourg-located Free Europe University in Exile (439-514), which was a gathering place of East 
and Central European youth to finish their respective higher education. Obviously, the goal 
was to teach democratic values and “prepare” them for the intellectual struggle against So-
viet encroaches in scientific and cultural fields. The plan was to have a capable and relatively 
young intellectual group poised to help in leading their countries after their respective liber-
ation from the Soviet yoke. Or, in Adolph A. Berle’s words, to provide “the raw material for 
democratic leadership.” (457) The November 1951 opening of the institution, however, was a 
rushed one, with a confused student and teacher body, without clear guiding principles, and 
plaguing linguistic inadequacies, which all contributed to the basic problem. (478-485) The 
changing international political landscape did not leave the FEUE immune to it either, and 
after some changes in functions for a short time, the College, after being “nothing more than 
a sinking ship,” came to a halt in 1958. (497)
As another unique aspect of the larger scope in the volume, one interestedly reads 
Toby Charles Rider’ study on the Cold War activities of the Hungarian National Sports Fed-
eration. (515-546) Sports were a special facet of the Cold War, where the nationalistic and 
ideological warfare was carried on in the wins or losses. In George Orwell’s words, “Serious 
sport has nothing to do with fair play… in other words it is war minus shooting.” (520) The 
HNC created its sports faction in 1949 (this was the Hungarian National Sports Federation) 
with the overt aim of using sports as a counterblow to the communist system. (522) Helping 
prominent athletes and coaches to defect and resettle was a primary goal of HNSF, especially 
at the Melbourne Olympic Games in 1956 right after the crushed Hungarian Revolution, in 
which case thirty-four Hungarian athletes did defect. (527-530) Since the FEC sponsored the 
HNSF until 1963, this is a very good example how many tentacles the organizations really 
had. This concluding essay is also a good call for further studies to be explored that can be 
connected with the FEC and its anti-communist struggle during the Cold War. 
The whole book is a welcomed and much-needed addition to Cold War studies and the 
history of the Cold War. Albeit always on the sidelines in the epic struggle between the two 
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antagonistic camps, the various national councils gained a measure of importance for their 
respective nationalities, whether at home or in the West, mainly in the United States. Some 
of the articles might be a little bit too detailed for a reader only with average curiosity in the 
Cold War, still it is an important contribution to the field, and not only for specialized readers. 
And it seems sure there is more to be found, so a second volume would be welcomed, where 
the various researchers go even deeper in the national councils’ work and achievements, or 
the lack of. 
